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RECENT DECISIONS
MASTER AND SERVANT-ToRTS-LIABILITY OF THE MASTER FOR
ACTS OF THE SERVANT BEYOND THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT.-
Defendant is a corporation operating a chain of stores for the sale
of groceries and meats. Each of the stores is under the direct
control of a manager. A boy entered one of the defendant's stores
with a rifle, to display it to the employees. The manager, with two
other employees, accompanied him to the basement where they nailed
a piece of wood to a door opening upon a street and, using it as a
target, each of them fired at least one shot thereat. A bullet pene-
trated the door and killed plaintiff's intestate who was passing along
the street. On appeal from judgment for the plaintiff, held, judg-
ment reversed and complaint dismissed. The use of the basement as
a shooting gallery was not authorized by the defendant nor did the
defendant have knowledge or acquiesce in the use of its premises for
that purpose. Ford v. Grand Union Co., 268 N. Y. 243, 197 N. E.
266 (1935).
The decision of the court is in accord with authority. It is true
that one in possession of property is under a duty not to use such
property, either himself or through his employees, in a manner dan-
gerous to others.' But the doctrine of respondeat superior has gen-
erally been restricted by the courts to acts of employees within the
scope of their duties 2 and in the course of their employment. 3 How-
ever, the liability of the master is not so narrowly confined in all
situations.4 Corporations have been held liable for the tortious acts
of their employees, when such acts were beyond the scope of their
employment. 5 The test in these cases is whether the master is negli-
gent in controlling the acts of his servant.0 If the tortious act is
done within the scope of the servant's duties, then the negligence of
the servant is imputed to the master.7 But if the negligent conduct
of the employee is beyond the scope of his employment, liability of
the master can be predicated only when it has been proved that the
act was committed on premises in possession of the master, or with
the use of his chattel, and with his knowledge or acquiescence.8
1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, COMMENTARIES (1926) §371; Appell v. Muller,
262 N. Y. 278, 186 N. E. 785 (1933).
'Fiocco v. Carver, 234 N. Y. 219, 137 N. E. 309 (1922).
'Standard Oil Co. v. Parkinson, 152 Fed. 681 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907).
'Harper and Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another (1934)
43 YALE L. J. 886, 896. For a general discussion of liability of the master
outside the course of employment.
'Fletcher v. Baltimore & Potomac R. R., Co., 168 U. S. 135, - Sup. Ct.
- (1897); Hogle v. Franklin Manufacturing Co., 199 N. Y. 388, 92 N. E.
794 (1910).
Hogle v. Franklin Manufacturing Co., 199 N. Y. 388, 92 N. E. 794 (1910).
1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (Sharswood ed. 1860) §431: General
rule of common law "If a servant by his negligence does damage to a stranger
the master shall be answerable for his neglect." McLaughlin v. N. Y. Edison
Co., 252 N. Y. 202, 169 N. E. 277 (1929) ; Coughlin v. Rosen, 220 Mass. 220,
107 N. E. 914 (1915).
' RESTATEMENT, TORTS, COMMENTARIES (1926) §317; instant case, 268
N. Y. 243, 197 N. E. 266 (1935).
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Thus, a single tortious act of the employee beyond the scope of
his employment on the premises of the employer, yet without its
knowledge or acquiescence or that of its authorized agent, absolved
the corporation from liability.9 In the instant case, had the defendant
the means of control and notice of the necessity of using such means?
It is clear that it did not. When the manager left the store to engage
in the target practice, he temporarily stepped out of the bounds of
his agency, and, pro tempore, the defendant was left without a
manager. Through whom then could it receive notice of its employees'
conduct? Through whom could it exercise control? The conclusion
is inevitable that the defendant had no reasonable means of control
over the situation which caused the injury.
D.G.
MORTGAGES-RIGHT OF HOLDER OF GUARANTEED MORTGAGE TO
REVOKE AGENCY OF GUARANTEE COMPANY IN REHABILITATION.-
The City Bank Farmers Trust Company was the owner of a bond
and mortgage to secure the payment of $5,000.00 with interest at
6% which had been guaranteed by the respondent under a policy
issued by the Bond and Mortgage -Company providing that the guar-
antee company "is irrevocably the agent of the insured until the
mortgage be paid." This policy contained the following conditions:
(a) that the guarantee company was bound to continue the guarantee
on the extension of the mortgage; (b) that the policyholder was
bound to permit the guarantee company to collect all interest and
principal so secured, and to enforce any payment which may come
due under said mortgage; and (c) that the policyholder was bound
to assign the bond and mortgage to the guarantee company, if
requested to do so, upon receipt from it of the amount due the policy-
holder. The bond and mortgage was past due and the principal was
unpaid. The interest had been paid and there were no arrears in
taxes. The Superintendent of Insurance was appointed rehabilitator
and took possession of the business and property of the respondent
guarantee company. In an action by the appellant bank for release
from its obligations under the policy, held, the appellant is entitled
to judgment absolving it from the obligations of the contract upon
its release of the guarantee company. Matter of People (Bond and
Mortgage Guaranty Company), City Bank Farmers Trust Company,
267 N. Y. 419, 196 N. E. 313 (1935).
The guarantee company here has no power coupled with an
interest, and the stipulation making it "irrevocably the agent" of the
I Walton v. New York Central Sleeping Car Co., 139 Mass. 556, 2 N. E.
101 (1885) ; Walker v. Hannibal and St. Joseph R. R. Co., 121 Mo. 575, 26
S. W. 360 (1894).
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